Since my pre-college days (circa 1991), I have been investigating in one way or another the basic unconscious and conscious (e.g., urges, impulse control, working memory) mechanisms in human action production. I was Born in Buenos Aires in 1974 and raised in the US (Miami) since the age of six. I was interested in experimental psychology and what was then called psychobiology since my pre-college days in Miami, when I came across books by Clark Hull and Donald Hebb. Later, I was mentored by Robert B. Tallarico at the University of Miami (B.A., 1996, Phi Beta Kappa, Cum Laude). I received my Ph.D. working with my doctoral advisor, Robert M. Krauss at Columbia University. During this time, I also worked with the neuropsychologist Michele Miozzo. My dissertation research ("The Motor Components of Semantic Representation") was awarded the Richard Christie Memorial Award. From fall 2003 till fall 2007, I was a Postdoctoral Fellow (NIH NRSA Award) at Yale University, working with my postdoctoral advisor, John Bargh. During this time, I also collaborated with the neuroscientist Jeremy Gray.
Following my postdoctoral training, I was hired as an Assistant Professor of Social Cognitive Neuroscience at San Francisco State University (where I am director of the Action and Consciousness Laboratory) and as an Adjunct Assistant Professor in the Department of Neurology at the University of California, San Francisco. I am also boardmember of the Scientific Advisory Board of the Institute of Cognitive Neurology (INECO; Buenos Aires).
To illuminate the basic conscious and unconscious mechanisms in action production, my research has integrated experimental approaches that are cognitive, affective, neurobiological, and social cognitive. Specifically, to understand the nature of these mechanisms, I have investigated action production at different levels of analysis and in different contexts, including simple actions, subjective urges, working memory, speech production, social action, and language use (communication cognition). Thus, my approach is broadly based in terms of dependent measures: cognitive, affective, social, and neurobiological.
My investigations fall broadly into three primary research lines.
Line 1: Action-related determinants of what enters consciousness. Representative paradigms and topics: backward masking, action-elicited intrusive cognitions, inattentional blindness, attentional blink, change blindness, the role of action in lexical retrieval.
Line 2: Action-related subjective modulations of processes that are already consciously available. Representative paradigms and topics: self-control, interference paradigms (e.g., Stroop, MSIT, flanker, and Simon tasks), authorship processing, valence from processing, sense of agency.
Line 3: Actional components of mental representation. Representative paradigms and topics: indirect cognitive control, ideomotor processing, embodied cognition, automatic imitation, priming, motor components of semantic representation, folk theories about action production.
In trying to understand the nature of complex nonconscious processes, one eventually encounters the thorny question, "Then what is consciousness for?" I have developed a theoretical framework (Supramodular Interaction Theory [SIT] and the PRISM principle) explaining the primary function of conscious states (see below, Psychological Review, 2005). I had the honor and pleasure of presenting this framework in an invited talk to the Harvard Department of Psychology. As well, the theory was covered in the media by MSNBC and the BBC. For more information about the theory, please visit the Action and Conscious Laboratory website (link at right).
In collaboration with John Bargh, Jeremy Gray, Adam Gazzaley, and Mark Geisler, I am evaluating SIT using behavioral and neuroimaging techniques. In addition, with the assistance of the neurologist Stephen Krieger and colleagues at the UCSF Memory and Aging center, we are examining the implications that SIT and the lab's research has for disorders of awareness and disorders involving action selection (e.g., frontotemporal dementia).